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ABSTRACT 
 
A quarter of the labour force in South Africa is currently unemployed with the majority of the 
unemployed being unskilled youth. One of the major causes seems to be the commanding power of 
trades union resulting in a high minimum wage for unskilled workers, which results in a reduction 
in the demand for unskilled labour.  To reduce the current unemployment rate in South Africa, 
policy decisions should be focused on youth employment with emphasis on skills development. 
Policy should also stimulate growth of small, medium and micro enterprises in order to stimulate 
job creation. A literature review indicates that current tax incentives in South Africa do not 
incentivise employers to hire unskilled youth labour, and are not applied on a wide enough scale 
to significantly impact the overall unemployment statistics. The proposed youth wage subsidy will 
increase the demand for unskilled labour by reducing the cost of labour. However, to have the 
desired impact, the participation rate must be high. The proposed subsidy was analysed against 
the successes and failures of subsidies implemented in the USA. It was found that many of the 
flaws identified in the USA have been avoided.  Based on the above, the recommendation is that 
the proposed youth wage subsidy is plausible in a South African context and should be 
implemented. The main concern is that newly employed youth would replace workers who do not 
meet the qualifications of the subsidy. This would have to be taken into account by policy makers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he percentage of the labour force currently unemployed in South Africa is 25%. The majority of the 
unemployed are unskilled youth, between the ages of 18 and 29 years (Statistics South Africa, 
2012:vi). The high unemployment percentage means that fewer people are contributing to the 
revenue pool generated by income tax. The causes of high unemployment statistics have been widely debated. One 
of the major causes appears to be the commanding power of trades union resulting in a high minimum wage for 
unskilled workers which does not correlate with their productivity. This has created an “inflexible” labour market 
and resulted in the reduction in the demand for unskilled labour (CDE, 2008:21).  
 
Tax incentives to reduce the cost of labour would theoretically increase the demand for labour (Lewis, 
2001:34). Although South Africa has certain indirect tax incentives, the low employment statistics prevail. Countries 
such as the United States of America (USA) have implemented some direct form of tax incentives over the years to 
motivate businesses to hire more workers. The South African Government announced in 2011 that it would spend 
R5 billion on job creation through a youth wage subsidy (Department of Finance, 2011:17). This could alleviate 
South African unemployment as it would be directly aimed at unskilled youth currently unemployed. However, the 
implementation thereof was halted by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the National Union 
of Metal Workers of South Africa (Numsa), refusing to agree to the subsidy (Anon, 2012). 
 
T 
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Although possible tax incentives which could be implemented in South Africa to promote job creation have 
been discussed (Lewis, 2001), different types of employment subsidies implemented in the USA have not been 
evaluated. Furthermore, the proposed youth wage subsidy has not been analysed against the successes and failures 
of employment subsidies implemented in the USA.  
 
The aim of the study is to determine to what extent the causes of unemployment in South Africa have been 
addressed by tax legislation and whether the proposed youth wage subsidy could aid in alleviating unemployment. 
The proposed youth wage subsidy is also analysed against the successes and failures of tax incentives implemented 
in the USA.  
 
This study provides valuable input for policy makers on whether or not the proposed youth wage subsidy is 
plausible in a South African context.  Information available as at 26 February 2013 has been taken into account. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Two employment incentives implemented in the USA were selected to be analysed. These two were 
selected because they had very different approaches and were introduced on different levels:  one on a federal level 
(New Jobs Tax Credit) and the other in the state of Georgia (Georgia’s Job Tax Credit).  The USA was selected as it 
is considered to be the forerunner in the world. Further, although South Africa and the USA represent different 
contexts in respect to the extent of unemployment, the commonality is that both countries introduced incentives to 
alleviate unemployment.  Also, the USA incentives were implemented some time ago, and there is statistical data 
available to analyse and compare the effect these incentives had on alleviating unemployment.  
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
Unemployment in South Africa 
 
A government funds its state expenses by the levying of tax. High unemployment in a country means fewer 
people contribute to the revenue pool generated by income tax. Currently, 25% of the South African labour force is 
unemployed. This is very high compared to the BRIC countries (namely Brazil 5%, Russia 5%, India 4% and China 
4%) and to the USA which has an 8% unemployment rate (Trading Economics, 2012). Furthermore, an emerging 
country’s economy cannot grow sufficiently if 25% of its population has no income to buy goods and services to 
stimulate the economy. Research suggests that high and persistent unemployment can become a threat to democracy, 
and is associated with support for an authoritarian government (Time, 2012). 
 
The 25% unemployment rate in South Africa amounts to 4.3 million workers (Statistics South Africa, 
2012:vi). Most of these are aged between 18 and 29 years; currently South Africa has the third highest percentage 
unemployed youth in the world (IndexMundi, 2012; Statistics South Africa, 2012: xiv). The level of education also 
plays a role; more than half of the unemployed have an education level of matric or lower (Statistics South Africa, 
2012: xiv). A further worrying aspect is that South Africa performs below par when it comes to alleviating 
unemployment in comparison with other emerging countries such as China, Brazil and Indonesia (CDE, 2011:7).  
 
There has been much debate and research around the causes of the South African unemployment crisis. In 
South Africa the trades union have the commanding power when it comes to determining minimum wages. This has 
caused a ‘large union wage effect’- where the cost of labour is not in correlation with productivity (Lewis, 2001:13). 
Odendaal (2012) states that “the unskilled labour was being overpaid on average over 100% and the semi-skilled 
labour forces were earning close to 60% more than they should”. The unskilled and semi-skilled workers are thus 
less attractive to employ in the labour market which has resulted in a higher level of unemployment.  
 
This phenomenon caused South African businesses to enter into a “skills-based technological change”, 
which has resulted in higher-skilled workers being in more demand than unskilled workers (CDE, 2008:20). This 
created an imbalance in the labour market in South Africa whereby most of the unemployed are unskilled. These 
unskilled workers are too expensive to hire. If more incentives are provided to businesses in employing unskilled 
labour, this could change (CDE, 2008:20). Furthermore South Africa has strict employment protection laws, which 
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increases the cost of dismissal. This discourages employers from hiring for fear of incurring these costs and also 
results in fewer lay-offs and thus a smaller gap for the youth to occupy on entering the market (CDE, 2008:21).  
 
In South Africa the majority of the labour market (68%) is employed by small businesses (Adcorp, 2012:2) 
and therefore growth in the small business sector is crucial. Despite the Government’s best efforts in providing 
initiatives to small businesses, South Africa is below average with regard to the number of adults starting up 
businesses when compared with other low- to medium income countries (SBP, 2009:2).  
 
Tax incentives within South Africa 
 
Although there is no direct tax relief given to an employer based on the number of workers his/her business 
employs, the Income Tax Act (58/1962) indirectly provides certain relief aimed at alleviating unemployment in 
South Africa.  
 
Table 1: Tax relief available 
Section within the Income Tax Act Causes of unemployment they could possibly resolve 
Section 12E: Small Business Corporations  Expansion of small businesses  
Section 12H: Learnership tax allowance  Reducing the cost of hiring and training employees 
 Skill development (all ages) 
Section 12I: Additional investment and training in respect of 
industrial policy projects 
 Creating employment opportunities 
 Increasing productivity 
 Skill development (all ages) 
 Expansion of small businesses 
 
Section 12E: Small Business Corporations 
 
The small and medium businesses are the driving factor in emerging economies such as South Africa’s. It 
is within this sector that there is the capacity for businesses to grow and for the number of workers employed to 
increase (Lewis, 2001:25). A survey done by the World Bank indicated that it is evident that most new employment 
in South Africa is created by small businesses entering the market, and not by the expansion of existing businesses 
(Lewis, 2001:25, 31). This raises a concern for South Africa as it illustrates that existing businesses do not expand as 
they should.  
 
For qualifying small business corporations, relief is provided in the form of an accelerated write-off of 
capital assets (100% for manufacturing assets and 50%/30%/20% per annum for other assets) and instead of the 
normal company tax rate of 28%, a slightly more favourable sliding tax scale has been legislated. The rationale 
behind this is that the saving in normal tax can be used to reinvest in the business to enable it to grow.  
 
Section 12H: Learnership tax allowance 
 
As explained, one of the driving forces of the South African unemployment rate is the number of unskilled 
workers in the market and a labour market that is unwilling to employ inexperienced workers at minimum wages. 
This resulted in the government creating an incentive for businesses to hire and provide training through registered 
learnership agreements. The R30 000 allowance per employee creates an incentive for employers to hire workers for 
a short term, and to provide them with the necessary training to increase their employability. It also provides an 
incentive to ensure that the employers complete the period of the learnership agreement, by providing  another tax 
allowance (also R30 000), once the agreement term is completed. The amount of the allowance increases to R50 000 
if the learner has a disability. Furthermore, the allowance creates an opportunity for an unskilled worker to gain 
valuable work experience and training to increase his/her employability in the future as employers could be more 
willing to employ a worker who was previously employed (CDE, 2011:33).  
 
A current evaluation of the allowance is under way, however the results are not yet available (South 
African Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2011). However, results of a previous evaluation published in 2007 
covering the first five years of the allowance indicates that this allowance had a minimal impact at the time and that 
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below 50% of the registered learners were previously unemployed (Fasset, 2007). Even though the learnership 
allowance was lucrative for businesses, the participation rate was low. This could be due to the stringent 
requirements in order to qualify for the allowance (learnerships must be registered with either a Skills Education 
Training Authorities (SETA) or the Manpower Training Act (56/1981)), which limited the target market to the few 
who qualified in terms of the requirements. Thus the allowance only resolves a small portion of the skill 
development problem. For the allowance to be more effective in addressing the factors of unemployment, it would 
have to target those who had previously been unemployed, as they are the workers’ who require the work experience 
and skills to be more employable.  
 
Section 12I: Additional investment and training in respect of industrial policy projects  
 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) launched this tax allowance in respect of project expenditure 
incurred for new projects (greenfield) or the expansion or upgrade of an existing project (brownfield). The DTI 
stated that the objective of the allowance was to increase the investment in manufacturing assets in order to improve 
the productivity of the manufacturing sector, and to train personnel in order to improve labour productivity as well 
as enhance the skills of the labour force (DTI, 2011:34).  
 
Qualification for this allowance is based on a points system meeting certain criteria listed in section 12I 
(8)(a)-(f) of the Income Tax Act.  A company has to show inter alia that it will be creating direct employment with 
the proposed project, and that there is evidence of training of employees for the purposes of skills development. 
Furthermore, the project must demonstrate that the company will be acquiring its goods and services from small, 
medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs). This will ensure that smaller enterprises obtain business from this 
initiative, and thus aid in the growth of small businesses in the country. The further positive outcome is that a newly 
employed person will be provided with skills to use in the market-place elsewhere in future.  
 
Employment subsidies will now be discussed after which the proposed youth wage subsidy will be 
analysed. 
 
Employment subsidies 
 
Background 
 
The aim of an employment subsidy is to lower labour costs while the wage incomes of employees remain 
constant (Lewis, 2001:34). This could be achieved by subsidising a portion of the employer’s labour costs or 
providing tax breaks based on the number of workers hired or jobs created (Lewis, 2001:34). It is expected that the 
provision of a subsidy will increase the demand for labour and these subsidies are generally aimed at less skilled 
workers (Lewis, 2001:34). Employment subsidies could be applied to all workers, or a specific pre-determined pool 
of individuals (National Treasury, 2011:28). According to Dagney (2002:263), the question that arises is whether or 
not these credits have created jobs that would not otherwise have been created in the absence of the credit. This type 
of subsidy requires more administration, which could prove to be costly. Finally, a form of ‘hiring subsidy’ could be 
implemented where the employer will get a subsidy for every worker he/she hires. This, however, could cause 
employers to fire and rehire individuals just to obtain the subsidy (National Treasury, 2011:28).  
 
Burns, Edwards and Pauw (2010:2) explain that either the worker or the firm can be subsidised. The first 
encourages unemployed workers to actively seek employment, and the latter is an incentive for employers to employ 
more workers. According to Smith (2006:7), the effect of both on the labour market is identical.  Burns et al. 
(2010:3) believe that the firm-side subsidy is more appropriate for South Africa as there is a lack of demand in the 
labour market. The worker-side subsidy would not be effective due to many believing that minimum wages and 
unionised bargaining reduced the demand for workers in South Africa.  
 
The firm-side subsidies have certain disadvantages, which could lead to the subsidy being ineffective. If the 
subsidy is targeted towards a certain group of individuals, it causes a huge administrative burden on the firm as the 
Government will need to evaluate the eligibility of workers. This may be costly and time consuming. Dagney 
(2002:267) splits compliance costs into two categories, namely start-up costs (gathering information and 
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implementing processes to ensure sufficient documentation) and annual costs (completing the relevant forms). For 
the subsidy to become successful, the benefit of the subsidy must outweigh the total additional business costs 
associated with it. Depending on whether the subsidy is a targeted subsidy, the firm may have concerns about 
assessing the eligibility of the worker based on the criteria provided. Research by Smith (2006:7-8) shows that this is 
a strong deterrent for firms not to act on the subsidy. Lastly, insufficient knowledge about the subsidy can also result 
in a low participation rate. 
 
The employment subsidy could either be a direct payment by some or another institution or a tax credit. 
The latter will be easier to administer as it will form part of an already established system. According to Hungerford 
and Gravelle (2010:13) a tax credit may not increase the employment levels as it was designed to do. This is due to 
the complexity of the provisions and cost of compliance. Furthermore companies may not be aware of the credit 
when they make hiring decisions and demand is ultimately the determining factor in a company’s hiring decisions. 
Some criticise employment tax incentives and state that they are only a solution when more effective means of job 
creation are politically indefensible (Time, 2012).  
 
Proposed employment subsidy in South Africa - Youth Wage Subsidy 
 
The Minister of Finance stated in his 2011 budget speech that the Government would set aside R5 billion 
towards youth unemployment (Department of Finance, 2011:17). The proposed youth wage subsidy as drafted by 
the National Treasury was submitted to the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) for 
negotiation with affected parties (Parker, 2012). During this stage the policy received wide criticism and the 
implementation thereof was halted by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the National Union 
of Metal Workers of South Africa (Numsa), which refused to agree to the subsidy (Anon, 2012). The Democratic 
Alliance (DA) indicated that it supports the subsidy in full (Du Plessis, 2012). Cosatu’s main opposition to the wage 
subsidy is that it will cause a substitution effect. By subsidising the youth, older workers might be replaced with 
young workers to ensure the subsidy is obtained (Cosatu, 2012). 
 
 The proposed subsidy is aimed at addressing the inflexible labour market and skills development. The 
employer is basically “compensated” for taking a risk in employing an inexperienced youth at a high wage. The 
duration of the subsidy is for a maximum period of two years, which the National Treasury (2011:40) believes is 
sufficient time to reduce the gap between wages and productivity. The employer could invest the subsidy on training 
and skills development. As the youth gain more work experience, the gap between the real wage and productivity 
will reduce (National Treasury, 2011:34), and the “employability” of the youth could increase due to work 
experience obtained (CDE, 2011:33).  
 
The “guiding principle” for the subsidy was simplicity and low cost of compliance (National Treasury, 
2011:39). As already explained, this will increase participation and aid in compliance. Smulders and Stiglingh 
(2008:335) state that among others, there is a large cost to South African small businesses in the time spent 
understanding the rules of the tax legislation, as well as maintaining the necessary records to comply with the rules.  
 
The subsidy is paid to the employer by way of a rebate against either employees’ tax or normal tax payable 
(National Treasury, 2011:43).  A subsidy can be claimed for existing workers (aged between 18 and 24 years) for 
one year if they earn below R60 000, being the ‘rounded up’ tax threshold for an individual below 65 years of age 
for a 2011/2012 tax year. The subsidy amounts to 20% of the annual salary if the person is earning below R24 000 – 
estimated to be the maximum amount earned by the average youth in the formal sector (National Treasury, 
2011:48). For workers earning R24 000, the subsidy amounts to R6 000 per annum and then gradually decreases to 
zero as the annual salary increases above R24 000 to R60 000, as can be seen in Table 2 below. For new workers 
(aged between 18 and 29 years) never employed before, the subsidy is calculated in exactly the same way except 
that the 20% increases to 50% and the subsidy for a person earning R24 000 increases to R12 000. Again the 
subsidy gradually decreases to zero as the salary increases above R24 000 to R60 000, as indicated in Table 2 below 
(National Treasury, 2011:48). 
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Table 2: Value of subsidy disaggregated into salary paid 
 Value of the subsidy 
Salary (Rand) New workers Existing workers 
0          – 23 999 50% of wage 20% of wage 
24 000 – 25 999 11 370 4 550 
26 000 – 27 999 10 740 4 300 
28 000 – 29 999 10 110 4 050 
30 000 – 31 999 9 480 3 800 
32 000 – 33 999 8 850 3 550 
34 000 – 35 999 8 220 3 300 
36 000 – 37 999 7 590 3 050 
38 000 – 39 999 6 960 2 800 
40 000 – 41 999 6 330 2 550 
42 000 – 43 999 5 700 2 300 
44 000 – 45 999 5 070 2 050 
46 000 – 47 999 4 440 1 800 
48 000 – 49 999 3 810 1 550 
50 000 – 51 999 3 180 1 300 
52 000 – 53 999 2 550 1 050 
54 000 – 55 999 1 920 800 
56 000 – 57 999 1 290 550 
60 000 - Nil nil 
Source: National Treasury (2011:49) 
 
The reason for the sliding scale is that the gap between the worker’s wage and productivity will narrow as 
the worker gains more experience and starts earning a higher salary (National Treasury, 2011:49).  The subsidy is 
tax exempt in the hands of the employer and therefore the employer can only claim the net wage (being the wage 
paid reduced by the subsidy) as a tax deduction (section 23(n) of the Income Tax Act 58/1962)). 
  
Table 3 illustrate how much tax a company could save if it qualifies for the youth wage subsidy. Assume a 
company spends R24 000 a year to employ a previously unemployed worker aged 20 years and that the company 
had a gross income of R100 000 for the tax year. Without the youth wage subsidy, the company would be paying 
R21 280 in income tax. Conversely, if the subsidy could be claimed, the company would only be liable for R12 640 
in income tax using the subsidy values set out above. The subsidy reduces the employer’s effective cost of youth 
labour by 36% being R8 640 divided by R24 000.  
 
Table 3: Tax savings if company employed a new worker at a salary of R24 000 a year 
 Normal tax liability (Rand) 
With the subsidy Without the subsidy 
Gross income 100 000 100 000 
Grant received – exempt in employer’s hands Nil Nil 
Salary deduction (net of subsidy to be received) -12 000 -24 000 
Taxable income 88 000 76 000 
   
Normal tax liability (28%) 24 640 21 280 
Tax credit -12 000 Nil 
Net tax liability 12 640 21 280 
   
Effective saving 8 640 Nil 
 
In Table 4 the tax saving is illustrated for the same example, except that the salary is greater than R24 000, 
being R46 000. 
 
 
 
  
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2013 Volume 12, Number 7 
2013 The Clute Institute  Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 775 
Table 4: Tax savings if company employed a new worker at a salary of R46 000 a year 
 Normal tax liability (Rand) 
With the subsidy Without the subsidy 
Gross income 100 000 100 000 
Grant received – exempt in employer’s hands Nil Nil 
Salary deduction (net of subsidy to be received) -41 560 -46 000 
Taxable income 58 440 54 000 
   
Normal tax liability (28%) 16 363 15 120 
Tax credit -4 440 Nil 
Net tax liability 11 923 15 120 
   
Effective saving 3 197 Nil 
 
Note that the subsidy reduces as the salary increases. Using Table 2, the company would qualify for a credit 
of R4 440. The tax saving is now only R3 197 and the cost of labour is reduced by approximately 7% (being R3 197 
divided by R48 000). The benefit at this salary level is marginal and it is evident that the aim of the subsidy is to 
motivate the employers to hire “lower-skilled, lower wage” workers (National Treasury, 2011:48). This is because 
the National Treasury wishes to target the majority of the unemployed youth, which they deem to be earning within 
the R24 000 a year range. 
 
The wage elasticity of the labour demand will determine how much of an impact the difference in the cost 
of labour will have on the labour demand. South Africa’s national average for wage elasticity is typically in the 
region of -0.5 to -0.7 (Development Policy Research Unit, 2008:10).  However, Fedderke (in National Treasury, 
2011:51) states that the wage elasticity of unskilled workers is between -2 and -2.23, which is an indication that 
unskilled labour is highly sensitive to wage changes. Thus, the benefit of targeting the unskilled youth is that the 
change in the cost of labour will theoretically have a significant impact on the demand for unskilled youth. 
Assuming a 36% decrease in labour costs, the minimum impact of the wage changes (assuming the national average 
elasticity of -0.5) is an 18% decrease in the youth unemployment rate. If the unskilled workers’ elasticity of -2 is 
applied, the minimum decrease of youth unemployment would be 72%. The subsidy is expected to increase the 
number of jobs by 423 000 throughout its duration of which only 178 000 (42%) would have been created in the 
absence of the subsidy. Therefore, 58% of the 423 000 jobs will be created as a result of the subsidy (National 
Treasury, 2011:40). 
 
Employment subsidies implemented in the United States of America 
 
Federal government level - New Jobs Tax Credit 
 
The New Jobs tax credit (NJTC) granted employers a tax credit in respect of the incremental jobs created. 
Employers qualified if they increased wages paid to at least 102% of the previous year’s wage base and if the wage 
bill had grown by 5% from the previous year. The credit was 50% of the increase in the wage base, but various 
limitations reduced the maximum benefit per employee further. A ceiling was also placed on the credit that a 
company could claim in total. It was therefore more beneficial for smaller to medium sized companies with fewer 
employees to apply for the credit than larger corporations (United States Department of Labor and Treasury, 
1986:30-31; Time, 2012). Over the course of its brief expensive life, the NJTC probably created only a handful of 
jobs (Time, 2012).  It was probably the complexity of the programme which could have increased compliance costs 
that resulted in some companies opting not to participate.  
 
State level - Georgia Job Tax Credit 
 
The Georgia Job Tax Credit had a different approach. The state provided a credit per full-time job created. 
It was a targeted subsidy, in that certain counties within Georgia in need of more development were identified. 
Those counties were assigned a higher credit per job created as well as a higher minimum of jobs to be created. The 
minimum number of jobs did not have to be maintained. However, if a company maintained its minimum number of 
jobs, it was entitled to claim the credit for each year in which it had maintained the minimum. The company could 
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only reduce its tax liability by a maximum of 50% by utilising the credit and could therefore not create a tax loss. 
Any unused credits could be carried forward to the next tax year (Dagney, 2002:265-266).  
 
The companies that participated in the Georgia Job Tax Credit increased their employment by over 50% 
(2002:271). Furthermore, the change in employment was greater in larger companies as these companies were more 
likely to have the capacity to take on more workers without a significant impact on their bottom line. Non-
participating companies either were not aware of the credit, or the cost of participating was greater than the credit 
that they would have received (Dagney’s, 2002:273). The Georgia employment subsidy therefore yielded positive 
benefits. 
 
Although participating firms created between 24% and 28% more jobs (1 870 and 2 196 jobs), 72% to 77% of 
those jobs created would have been created in the absence of the credit (Dagney, 2002:277). The credit therefore did 
not significantly influence employment decisions, but still aided in reducing the cost of labour. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
To reduce the current unemployment rate in South Africa, policy decisions should be focused on youth 
employment with emphasis on skills development. Policy makers will also need to focus on what SMMEs identify 
as their constraints to growth, as growth in this sector will lead to higher employment. 
 
It is clear that the three types of indirect relief provided by tax legislation do not adequately address the 
causes of unemployment, as they are not directly focused on incentivising employers to hire unskilled youth labour. 
Furthermore, they are not on a wide enough scale to make a significant impact on the overall unemployment rate in 
South Africa.  
 
The small business corporation tax does not directly incentivise employment and there is also no guarantee 
that these businesses will use an amount equal to the amount of tax saved to employ more workers. Although the 
learnership allowance deals with the concern of skills shortage in South Africa, it does not focus on previously 
unemployed individuals. Currently an evaluation of the allowance is under way, but there is currently no evidence 
available to prove that a learner is able to find employment after completing a learnership. The allowance in respect 
of additional investment and training in industrial projects could be an answer to creating sustainable employment 
for the labour force of South Africa. However, the process to obtain approval for the project seems long and onerous 
and the administrative burden placed on a company may outweigh the benefit. Furthermore, the allowance is aimed 
more at businesses that are able to fund large expansion projects. Except for the points allocated to purchasing 
goods, this allowance is not focused on promoting SMMEs.  
 
Based on the above research it is evident that there is a need for a more direct incentive aimed at the 
majority of the unemployed in South Africa, which is exactly what the proposed youth wage subsidy would do. It 
follows a similar pattern to that of the Georgia Tax Credit in that it is targeted at a specific group of individuals, 
namely the unskilled low income youth. Furthermore, although the subsidy is not specifically targeted at SMMEs, it 
would be lucrative for these businesses to participate due to low administration costs and the simplified design of the 
policy. However, the participation rate will have to be high to make a significant impact on the unemployment rates. 
 
The proposed design avoids many of the flaws identified in the USA. The Georgia Tax Credit was simple 
and accessible, which increased its success rate.  In comparison, the NJTC was overly complex which caused high 
compliance costs, which resulted in its low participation rate limiting its impact. Although the youth wage subsidy 
was designed to have a low cost of compliance, finding suitable unemployed youths might result in additional costs 
to the employer. This could be overcome by way of job assistance programmes in order to reduce the time and 
money spent by businesses searching for youths to employ.  
 
Any ceiling imposed by policy makers is also a determining factor in the participation rate. The Georgia 
Tax Credit had ceilings, namely a minimum number of jobs had to be created and a company could not reduce its 
tax liability by more than 50% in utilising the credit. The youth wage subsidy has no such ceilings which makes the 
youth wage subsidy more lucrative. The administration burden created by the Georgia Tax Credit to prove the 
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number of workers employed will be eliminated and the employer can use the full tax credit in any given year.  This 
will mean that each job created will result in a tax benefit which is expected to increase the participation rate. 
 
Another benefit that companies would have under the proposed youth wage subsidy is that the employer 
has the option to claim the subsidy either through the PAYE system or through a tax credit on the company’s annual 
income tax return. This places the power of choice into the taxpayer’s hands, which increases the motivation to 
participate. The subsidy is also designed in such a way that the company will reduce the amount owed to SARS 
instead of physically applying for the subsidy, which provides more motivation to businesses to participate as the 
benefits will be more immediate.  
 
To combat a possible substitution effect, the design of the subsidy should ensure that the rights of workers 
not eligible for the subsidy are protected. The policy could, for example state that the employment level of older 
workers before the implementation should be maintained after implementation. This will then have to be confirmed 
by way of audits by either SARS or the Department of Labour.  
 
The one unavoidable consequence of the subsidies in the USA was that jobs were subsidised which would 
have ordinarily been created in the absence of the subsidy. Unfortunately this might also happen in the case of the 
youth subsidy.  
 
In theory, the youth wage subsidy would influence the majority of the unemployed in the South African 
labour market. It cannot guarantee that the unskilled youth will obtain the skills needed to be able to be more 
employable in future. However, it would demonstrate that the youth are employable and it is hoped that the two 
years’ experience gained by the subsidy would increase their employability.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this study is to provide valuable input for policy makers on whether or not the proposed youth 
wage subsidy is a plausible solution to unemployment in the South African context. To reduce the current 
unemployment rate in South Africa, policy decisions should be focused on youth employment with emphasis on 
skill development. It should also stimulate growth of SMMEs and job creation.  
 
A literature review indicates that current tax incentives in South Africa do not incentivise employers to hire 
unskilled youth labour and are not on a wide enough scale to significantly impact on the overall unemployment 
statistics. The proposed youth wage subsidy will not only increase the demand for unskilled labour, but will also 
reduce the cost of labour, which is crucial in an “inflexible” labour market. However, to have the desired impact, the 
participation rate must be high. 
 
The proposed youth wage subsidy was analysed against the successes and failures of subsidies 
implemented in the USA. It was found that many of the flaws identified in the USA have been avoided, such as 
subsidies being overly complex and a large administrative burden to the employer. The proposed youth wage 
subsidy is simple and accessible with low compliance costs. No ceilings are proposed which will mean that each job 
created will result in a tax benefit. The employer has the option to use the full credit either through the PAYE 
system or as a tax credit on the annual income tax return. This will make the benefit more immediate as opposed to 
applying for a subsidy and will improve the employer’s cash flow. 
 
Based on the above, it is noted that that the proposed youth wage subsidy is plausible in a South African 
context and it is recommended that the subsidy should be implemented. The main concern is that newly employed 
youth would replace workers who do not meet the qualifications of the subsidy. This would defeat the purpose of 
creating employment and would have to be taken into account by policy makers.  The one unavoidable consequence 
of the youth wage subsidy might be that jobs will be subsidised that would ordinarily have been created in the 
absence of the subsidy. Furthermore, the subsidy is not a guarantee that the unskilled youth will obtain the skills 
needed to be able to be more employable in future.  
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